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Abstract 
The standard hotelling model with linear transportation costs predicts an aggregation of the two competing firms in the 
middle of the customers support interval (Minimum Differentiation Principle). Using quadratic transportation costs, the 
two firms would locate in the opposite extremities of the interval (Maximum Differentiation Principle). Both cases 
assume bidirectional purchasing ability : a consumer can buy from a firm whether it is located on her right or on her 
left. In a situation where a consumer can buy only from firms located on her right (left), we show that one firm would 
locate at the right (left) end of the hotelling line while the other would locate at 3/5 (2/5) from the left end.
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     1. Introduction
Hotelling competition model (1929) is one of the pionnering work in the
theory of location. In a linear city with linear transportation costs, the
model predicts an aggregation of the two competing ￿rms in the middle of
the customers support interval (Minimum Di⁄erentiation Principle).
On the other hand, D￿ Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) have
shown that the Minimum Di⁄erentiation Principle does not hold with quadratic
transportation costs; to reduce price competition, ￿rms have a tendency to
di⁄erentiate themselves by choosing locations at the ends of the customers￿
line.
Other studies show that the minimum di⁄erentiation may arise in equilib-
rium. For example, Jehiel (1992) and Friedman and Thisse (1993) consider
price collusion after ￿rms have made location choices while De Palma et al.
(1985) use unobservable attributes in brand choice.
All such studies assume bidirectional purchasing ability: a consumer can
buy from a ￿rm whether it is located on her right or on her left. In unidirec-
tional hotelling lines, location equilibria could be di⁄erent from the standard
hotelling results. Examples of unidirectional cases are highway and one way
roads and non revertible ￿ ows in oil and gas pipelines: a consumer can buy
only from a ￿rm located on her right (one way road) or on her left (￿rms
pumping oil and gas on her left).
The remainder of this note is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
the setting. Section 3 derives the equilibrium and Section 4 concludes.
2. A hotelling unidirectional model
We consider a variant of the linear hotelling model . Two ￿rms A and B
with zero marginal costs are located within the segment [0;1] which represents
a continuous set of consumers distributed with a density equal to 1. Firm
A(B) is located in position a (b), where
a + b ￿ 1
and; a ￿ 1 ￿ b
1.
As in the standard Hotelling model, a consumer pays a price P for the
product and a quadratic transportation cost. A consumer can buy only from
a ￿rm located on her right hand side. All consumers derive the same intrinsic
utility (U) from consumption. U is assumed large so that all consumers want
to consume the product as long as they can do it. If the price charged by
￿rm A(B) is PA(PB) and the unit transportation cost is t then a consumer
located in x derives a disutility equal to:
PB + t(1 ￿ b ￿ x)
2 if a ￿ x ￿ 1 ￿ b
PA + t(a ￿ x)
2 if 0 ￿ x ￿ a
If x > 1 ￿ b and b 6= 0; then the consumer located in x cannot buy any
product.
The two ￿rms compete in a two stage game; in the ￿rst period they choose
their locations then compete in prices in the second stage.
3. Equilibrium
In the second stage, the two ￿rms compete in prices. A consumer located
in [0;a] is indi⁄erent in buying from A or B if:
PA + t(a ￿ xI)





2t(1 ￿ a ￿ b)
+
1 + a ￿ b
2
The pro￿t of ￿rm A(B) is:
￿A = PAxI






















(1 ￿ a ￿ b)(3 ￿ 3b ￿ a)
The indi⁄erent customer and the market shares of the ￿rms are de￿ned
by:
xI =
3 ￿ 3b + a
6
1 ￿ b ￿ xI =
3 ￿ 3b ￿ a
6























(9 ￿ 7a ￿ 9b)(3 ￿ 3b ￿ a) < 0
Firm B is therefore better o⁄located in location 1(b = 0):Firm A is better
o⁄ located in the lowest possible value of a. Since xI = 3￿3b+a
6 ￿ a; we have,
33 ￿ 3b + a
6
= a;























Notice that both ￿rms are serving their hinterlands but because of com-
petition, they are not pricing their products in a way to extract consumers
rent.
4. Conclusion
In the standard hotelling model, customers can buy from ￿rms regardless
of their positions on the Hotelling line. The linear transportation costs imply
the principle of Minimum Di⁄erentiation while a quadratic transportation
cost leads to the Maximum Di⁄erentiation Principle. In cases where the
customer can buy only from ￿rms located on her right, we show that one
company would locate in position 3/5 from the left end while the other would
locate in the right end. By symmetry, if the customer is able to buy only
from ￿rms located on her let, then one ￿rm would locate in the left end while
the other could locate at 3/5 from the right end.
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